James Bell Kant essay Mick Bowles Question four. “Being is obviously not a real predicate”. What role does this remark play in Kant’s critique of the ontological argument for the existence of God? Introduction. In this essay, I am going to explain the meaning of the phrase “being is obviously not a real predicate” in Kant’s critique of the ontological argument for the existence of God. I will do this by firstly explaining the ontological argument, and thence what Kant’s notions of God actually are. Then I will be able to fully explain the importance of the quote and the role that it plays in Kant’s critique. Finally, I will sum up the philosophical considerations that have arisen in the form of a conclusion. The ontological argument. The ontological argument for the existence of God appears in brief form in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (page. 503), but perhaps the best explanations of it were established in the works of Descartes and Leibniz. Leibniz asserts that the more traditional view created by Descartes (taken from a previous argument by St. Anselm) needs to show first that the concept of God includes existence. This argument can be broken down into four steps: 1) Does the concept “God” include existence? 2) Something might have existence if it is possible. Note that to be possible the proposition of the existence of God must not be a logical contradiction. 3) God is not a logical contradiction and therefore he is possible. 4) ?the concept of God includes existence. Now that it that the concept of God includes existence, we can consider the ontological argument proposed by Descartes in the Meditations. The argument runs thus: “I find it easy to persuade myself that existence can also be separated from the essence of God, and hence that God can be thought of as not existing. But when I concentrate more carefully, it is quite evident that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than the…idea of a mountain can be separated from the idea of a valley” . Descartes believed that certain things such as triangles have what he called: “True and immutable natures ” This means that although the idea of a triangle may exist only in the mind, the concept “triangle” has a fixed essence or nature that is constant and does not depend on a mind. For Descartes once things about triangles are proved he cannot withdraw assent from these truths. This leads him to believe that this may give him a model for the proof of God. This proof runs along the following lines: 1) Descartes idea of God is that he is the supremely perfect being. 2) This idea is has true and immutable nature (It does not depend on the mind). 3) Gods existence (is it?) belongs to his essence (what is it?) in the same way as things proved about triangles belong to them. 4) God existence from his essence in the same way that mountains cannot be separated from valleys. 5) Gods’ essence is unable to be understood without existence because if he is the supremely perfect being he must have all perfections, existence is perfection so he must have it. 6) If we allow God to be possible then we cannot avoid step 5. 7) ? God exists unless we deny his possibility. There are many objections against this “proof” ( see endnotes), but it is those of Kant that are important here. I will start by explaining what the concept of God means for Kant. Kants view of God. Kant states in the Critique of Pure Reason: “What to us is an a ideal was in Plato’s view an idea of the divine understanding, and individual object of its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible being, and the archetype of all copies in the field of appearance ”. For Kant ideals have a practical power as regulative principles that form the basis of the possible perfection of certain actions. They are further removed from objective realty than ideas, but they are not figments of the mind. Their ability is that of supplying reason with a practicable standard in the form of a complete concept. They are ideas not in concreto but in individuo. The ideal of reason is the complete determination in accordance with a priori rules, which since they are a priori cannot be found in experience. Therefore, the concept is transcendent. This leads to the question of what the transcendental ideal is. For Kant every concept is undetermined until brought into synthesis. A concept is subjected to determination on the grounds that of every two contradictory predicates only one can belong to it, and so on, and so forth until the concept has been determined. This also applies for every thing, which is subjected to the principle of complete determination, which is to say that if all possible predicates are taken together with their diametrical opposites then one of each pair must belong to it. This is comparing each thing not only in relation to two contradictory opposites, but also to the sum of all possible predicates. This notion involves a transcendental presupposition: “The material for all possibility, which in turn is regarded as containing a priori the data for the particular possibility of each and every thing ”. This implies that to know anything completely, we must know every possible predicate. This principle cannot be known in concreto. This could lead one to think that the sum-total of all possibility must be undetermined because the predicates that constitute it are so. However, Kant notes that it does define itself as a concept because it is determined a priori: “It thus becomes the concept of an individual object which is completely determined through the mere idea, and must therefore be entitled an ideal of pure reason ”. Kant writes that if one was to consider all possible predicates transcendentally then we shall find both transcendental negation and affirmation. Transcendental negation differs from logical negation in that logical negation refers to the relation of the first concept with another concept, whereas transcendental negation is non-being itself. Transcendental affirmation is therefore reality in that it expresses being in itself. Kant calls the substrate that contains all possible predicates of things the Omnitudo Realitatis: all reality. However, this is the concept of a thing in itself which has been completely determined. There is, for Kant, a transcendental ideal. This is the basis for the determination of all things: the Ens Realissimum, which is the ideal of reason because: “It in this one case is a concept of a thing completely determined in and through itself, and known as the representation of an individual ”. The logical determination of a concept is based on the two premise/conclusion disjunctive syllogism. The major premise contains an either/or division, which is limited by the minor premise and leads to the conclusion. However, the transcendental major premise is the representation of all of reality. Complete determination is not possible unless it rests in the limitation of this reality. Kant posits that reason does not presuppose the existence of a single being that could correspond to this ideal, only that there is an idea of such a being. This is the Primordial being, the object of the ideal of reason, God, all reality. Kant thinks that we are without knowledge of the existence of such a being, which must be, in his view, simple and not constitute of any things. By this Kant means, that God must be the ground for the existence of all things and therefore cannot be made up of the things he is the ground of. This is Kant’s idea of God, as an ideal of reason. It is clear on this footing to see why he would attack the ontological arguments for the existence of God, not because he does not believe in the existence of God, but because he finds their arguments flawed and not based on any transcendental position. With Kant’s definitions in hand, we can now move onto his critique of the ontological argument directly. Kants critique of the ontological argument. Kants critique starts with his comments about necessity, which are in section three (p. 495). Kant states that humans believe that God is real because we are indoctrinated to search for the unconditioned. If we admit there are things that exist then we must admit there are things that exist necessarily. Kant thinks that reason looks around for a concept that is compatible with an absolute necessity, and finds God. However it does not necessarily follow that a limited being cannot be compatible with absolute necessity, only that we cannot infer its necessity from any universal concepts, because being limited it doesn’t qualify for any. This is in the same way as an invalid syllogistic argument, if the universal or major premise does not hold nor does the minor premise. Kant writes that there are only three ways that Gods existence can be proved by speculative reasoning the one that concerns this essay is: Ontological: which is a process that abstracts from all experience, and argues completely a priori from mere concepts to the existence of a supreme cause. Kant writes that an “Absolutely Necessary Being” is something the non- existence of is impossible. However, this definition gives us no insight into the conditions that would produce an “Absolute Necessary Being”. Such conditions are needed in order to determine whether, in positing this concept, we are thinking anything at all. Kant looks at Descartes examples of geometry, and claims that they are taken from judgements, and not things and their existence. For example, Descartes’ claims about geometry: A triangle has three sides Kant notes that the absolute necessity of the judgement is only a conditioned necessity of the thing itself. I.e. under the condition: There is a triangle, we will necessarily find that it has three angles. In a proposition, if I reject the predicate but not the subject then there is a contradiction. For example, there cannot be a triangle without three sides. Therefore, the predicate belongs to the subject. However, if both the subject and the predicate are rejected together there is no contradiction. For example: There is no triangle If there is no triangle, it does not matter how many sides it has. Kant uses this argument in the following example: “’God is omnipotent’ is a necessary judgement ”. One cannot reject the omnipotence if we keep the subject “God”. If however we reject both, there is no contradiction. This is a careful refutation of St Anselm’s proof, but there is a counter claim against this argument that was postulated by Descartes. The counter claim is to argue there are subjects that cannot be removed, called absolutely necessary subjects. Such a subject is God; the concept of which we have shown is possible. For “Ens Realissimum” is the only concept for which the rejection of its object is in itself contradictory. This would follow Descartes argument in mediation five that “all reality” must necessarily contain as part of its concept: existence. However, Kant notes that there is a contradiction at work, that is introducing the concept of existence into the concept of a thing of which we can only (as yet) be thinking of terms of its mere possibility. For Kant we must examine whether: “Is the proposition …an analytic or a synthetic proposition? ” If it is analytic, asserting that the concept “all reality” contains existence is saying nothing. Kant posits two cases: 1) There is nothing more than the thought that exists inside us; i.e. it is a human invention. 2) We have presupposed the existence is possible and than on, the strength of that inferred the actual existence. Either of these are not satisfactory for Kant. However, the proposition could be synthetic, which would mean that it tells us something new about the subject. If something new is added then it is not part of the essence of the subject and can be safely rejected. This is for Kant an illusion that is caused by confusion between a logical and a real predicate. A logical predicated could be anything we like. For example: God is God Or God is a banana. On the other hand, a real predicate is a predicate that determines a thing. I.e. a predicate that is added to the subject and enlarges it. For example: The building is black Nevertheless, this does not presuppose existence on the part of the house. If we were to take something, that is only possible, for example: £100 To this, we could add any number of predicates, e.g.: £100 is 5 x £20 However if I said; The £100 exists This is different type of added predicate, which moves away from the possible £100 to the existential £100. If a concept contains existence, it would have to have an empirical object that it corresponds to. If it does not, then while the possible and the actual are similar they are not identical. With objects of pure thought, we have no means of knowing that they exist since this would require apriori knowledge. Kant points out: “’Being’ is obviously not a real predicate; that is it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing ”. Therefore, if we take the subject “God” and say, “God is” we are actually attaching no new predicates. No matter how much of the universe our concept may contain, we have to go outside of it if we are going to give it existence. Conclusion Therefore, it is clear to see the role that the quote above plays in Kant’s critique of the ontological argument for the existence of God: Being designates only what is possible. The proposition “God exists” may be without a inherent contradiction, but this says nothing about the existence of God itself, to do that we need to have a synthetic proposition with a corresponding empirical object of experience. Having now refuted the ontological arguments for the existence of God, Kant is now free to expand his own view of God as the ground for the freedom to perform moral actions. End. 2411 words. 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